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Abstract:
This paper suggest a typology of possible sources of synergies. The paper further
proposes that companies cannot exploit all opportunities for synergy because
these may require coordination which might add costs that more than offset the
advantages gained. The cost of coordination in turn depends on the organiza-
tional context, because it affects the way the sources of synergies must be coordi-
nated. These propositions are subsequently illustrated with examples from the
Danish company, Danfoss.
Acknowledgments
This paper would not have been possible without the valuable assistance pro-
vided by Manager Vibeke Gustafsson and Vice President Hans Jørgen Pedersen,
Danfoss, who have contributed significantly to the case material through several
interviews and discussions. Helpful suggestions and comments to this paper has
been given me by Nicolai J. Foss and Jens Frøslev Christensen. All errors and lack
of consistency is, of course, entirely due to my own inadequatecy.
Index:
INTRODUCTION................................................................................................................................... 1
SOURCES OF SYNERGY ...................................................................................................................... 2
FORMS AND COSTS OF COORDINATION .................................................................................... 4
SELECTION OF COORDINATION MECHANISMS ....................................................................... 6
COORDINATION OF SYNERGIES AT DANFOSS ..........................................................................................11
General description of the corporate control system at Danfoss .........................................................13
Asset sharing ....................................................................................................................................14
Vertical complementarity..................................................................................................................21
Horizontal complementarity .............................................................................................................22
CONCLUDING REMARKS.................................................................................................................24
BIBLIOGRAPHY....................................................................................................................................26
Synergy and Organization 1
Introduction
Numerous researchers have suggested that diversity in the assets and ac-
tivities of diversified firms may be exploited to achieve benefits, often referred to
as synergies, by sharing of activities subject to size economies (economies of
scale/scope) or by performing mutually adjusted (complementary) activities.
There are a number of reasons for the existence of vertically and horizon-
tally integrated firms. Adam Smith argued that the degree of division of labor is
limited by the extent of the market. If demand is insufficient to obtain maximum
scale efficiency in certain activities and market imperfections prevent selling ex-
cess capacity to external customers, then scale efficient activities provide a ration-
ale for sharing capacity among different lines of business internally (Teece, 1982).
The internal workings of firms may also create pressure for growth in the range
and size of activities performed. As explained by Edith Penrose (1959), indivisi-
bilities lead to organic growth because increasing the degree of capacity utiliza-
tion of existing assets through sharing between different uses lead to the acquisi-
tion of complementary or supporting resources. These new assets will also be in-
divisible to some degree, thus leading to continued pressure to expand the size of
the corporation to avoid idleness of resources. Dedication of activities to other,
complementary, activities also lead to expansion of the firm because dedication
creates vulnerability to appropriation of rents by trading partners (Williamson,
1985). For these reasons, firms tend to become diversified in terms of activities
and markets served.
The purpose of this paper is to propose how different kinds of synergies
can be obtained from this diversity. The paper takes the perspective of corporate
management in addressing this issue. The paper is structured into four parts. The
first part deals with the identification of potential synergies. The second discusses
different forms of coordination and their associated costs. In the third part, that
discussion is linked to the sources of synergies identified in the first part by re-
lating the coordination requirements of the sources of synergy to the characteris-
tics of the different coordination mechanisms discussed in the second part. The
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fourth part illustrates the discussion with examples of coordination of synergies
found in the Danish company, Danfoss. The implications of the illustrations are
discussed in a concluding remarks section.
Sources of Synergy
Synergies may be obtained by sharing assets between business units if
production based on these assets are subject to declining average unit cost, that is
if economies of scale or scope can be obtained. One source of size economies is
equipment dedicated to a particular task, which allows this task to be performed
with greater efficiency than with generic or non-specific equipment (Montgomery
and Wernerfelt, 1988). Increased division of labor and specialization of tasks al-
lows subsets of activities to be performed with greater efficiency by reducing the
costs of setting up and changing tasks, and by accumulating more experience and
knowledge of the particular task. Dedicated equipment and specialized tasks are
only efficient when the services they produce are required in high volumes be-
cause dedication and specialization comes with a loss of flexibility that reduce the
value in alternative use. Thus dedication and specialization create indivisible ca-
pacity. Sharing can reduce the loss from idleness of indivisible assets by increas-
ing the degree of capacity utilization. Finally, increasing the dimensions of physi-
cal objects (e.g. buildings) may be less costly than multiplying similar, but smaller
ones to reach a sufficient scale (Langlois, 1997).
Efficiency gains can also be achieved by adapting different assets or ac-
tivities to a common purpose by making them mutually supportive and eliminate
waste from reworking of outputs (Porter, 1996). Complementarity can be achieved
in a succession of activities where different steps in a chain are adjusted to the
preceding and/or proceeding steps for example in the timing of transfer (e.g. JIT),
or by improving the interface between activities (making the output fit the input
requirements, and/or changing the input requirements to fit the output (Porter,
1985)). Likewise, by adapting to existing resources, new assets can be made more
efficient and new opportunities can be exploited faster than if the complementary
assets had to be acquired as well. The effects of obtaining complementarity be-
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tween activities performed in succession will be referred to as vertical comple-
mentarities, which  can also be obtained at higher (strategic) levels, for example
by accompanying product line proliferation, or increased rate of product devel-
opment, with flexible manufacturing systems and increased customer segmenta-
tion (Milgrom and Roberts, 1990). Complementarities achieved by combining as-
sets or activities to perform a single task can similarly be called horizontal com-
plementarities. Horizontal complementarities may be achieved by adapting par-
allel activities to each other to increase the value of combining the outputs at a
later stage, for example by making intermediate products that fit together when
assembled (Whitney, 1988), or by enhancing the combined functionality of bun-
dled products to customers (Spiller and Zelner, 1997).
Three fundamental sources of synergy can thus be identified leading to
proposition 1:
Synergy can be obtained by:
1. Sharing indivisible assets whose acquisition cost are amortized over 
multiple uses.
2. Optimizing the flow of activities (Vertical complementarities).
3.  Combining the outputs of mutually adjusted activities to achieve supe-
rior functionality of the combined output (Horizontal complementarities).
These different sources of synergy require different forms of coordination
if asset sharing pose coordination problems that are different from the problems
of coordinating mutual adaptation. The costs of coordination may, however, lead
to dis-synergy because the resources spent on coordination more than offset the
gains in efficiency. Lack of proper coordination may also prevent the realization
of synergies because no sharing or complementarity is achieved. Likewise, loss of
accountability caused by corporate management intervention in the affairs of in-
dependent business units may add costs to synergy exploitation that more than
offset the benefits. Different forms of coordination may result in different levels of
direct coordination costs and different degrees of loss of accountability. From this
proposition 2 can be developed:
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Net synergy is only derived from particular instances of the sources of synergy de-
scribed above, namely those for which the benefits exceeds the direct and indirect
costs of coordination.
Forms and Costs of Coordination
The need for coordination arise when the outcome of one activity depends
on how, or when, another activity is performed. In self-sufficient (closed) systems
activities are coordinated within the system itself, but specialization among sys-
tems (for example firms or business units within a firm) require the systems to
engage in exchanges with other systems whose action they cannot control directly.
Thus the need for some form of exterior coordination arises. Among firms coordi-
nation is achieved through autonomous adaptation to signals in the form of prices
and in the form of more or less comprehensive contracts stipulating the terms of
exchange and cooperation. Market coordination may become too costly if trading
partners are mutually dependent because insuring against opportunistic behavior
from either party is impossible unless all future contingencies are known, which is
unlikely because people have limited information processing abilities (William-
son, 1985). Organizing dependent activities within a firm put a limit on oppor-
tunistic behavior because disputes are settled by fiat (Williamson, 1985). Inside
firms a number of coordination mechanisms are available ranging from market-
like transfer prices to hierarchical ordering through planning and direction, to
team-like continuous mutual adjustment. These polar cases have different prop-
erties with respect to incentive effects and use of resources, and thus to the cost
and efficiency of coordination.
Coordinating through transfer prices and mutual adjustment maintain a
large degree of accountability (i.e. relatively strong incentives) at the business unit
level which is difficult to uphold when hierarchical ordering is involved. Cen-
tralized planning remove responsibility from business unit level to corporate
level, and thus diminish the strength of incentives.
The amount of resources consumed by coordinating activities depends on
the type and amount of information that needs to be processed and transmitted.
Once transfer prices have been set, they require little additional information to be
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collected and transmitted. Resources will of course have to be spend on deter-
mining the type of transfer pricing rule (e.g. cost-based, negotiated, market based
or strategic) and settling the terms, but once established, companies tend to stick
to a single transfer pricing rule (Eccles, 1985). The information that has to be
transmitted both laterally and vertically is quantifiable (financial and quantities)
and therefore easy to communicate. Transfer pricing also allow standardization of
information into financial terms making it easily comparable across time and
business units. Transfer pricing thus consume few resources in coordinating ac-
tivities.
Mutual adjustment between business units requires more intensive lateral
communication to discover the needs and expectations of the partner, which in
case of changes in the circumstances of the cooperation or uncertainty have to
continue as long as the exchange continues. The information exchanged laterally
is unlikely solely to be quantitative, because then transfer pricing would suffice.
Vertical communication, however, can be in financial terms since actual coordina-
tion is performed by the directly affected/involved parties. Mutual adjustment,
thus, poses information processing requirements at the corporate level similar to
those of transfer pricing.
Planning and direction require less lateral information transfer than mu-
tual adjustment because quantitative and qualitative information is transmitted to
a hierarchical superior who decides on the appropriate action of the units based
on the information received (Arrow, 1974, Radner, 1992). This means that exten-
sive and heterogeneous information has to be processed at the corporate level and
thus consumes considerable amounts of corporate resources.
Low lateral
and vertical
High lateral
low vertical
Low lateral
High vertical
Transfer
pricing
Business
unit
Mutual
adjustment
Planning and
directionCorporate
Direction of information flow
 and intensity of information processing
Level of accountability
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Economizing on costs of weakened incentives due to corporate level in-
tervention and resources spend on transmitting and processing knowledge re-
quires that the more expensive ones (mutual adjustment and planning) are re-
served for the transactions that require them. Mutual adjustment is less costly
than planning because accountability is maintained at business unit level, and
consume less of scarce corporate management resources because information is
quantitative1. Mutual adjustment may also incur less distortion of information
because information is transmitted directly to those with operating responsibility
instead of going through a higher hierarchical layer.
Selection of coordination mechanisms
Sacrificing incentive intensity is necessary when strong incentives lead to
sub-goal pursuit at the expense of overall performance. High levels of interde-
pendence between business units obscure individual contributions to a coopera-
tive venture, and thus make it very costly to reach an agreement on a distribution
of rents that is perceived to be fair by all parties. Differences in actual or perceived
interdependence of partners may also create conflict because the one experiencing
the least amount of interdependence will be less committed to continue the rela-
tionship and may hold up their partner for a larger proportion of the rent gener-
ated (McGann and Ferry, 1979). If conflict between business units arise, interven-
tion from the corporate level may be required. Since contributions may be ob-
scured in the case of high interdependence, quantitative and financial information
is inadequate to settle conflicts over distribution of gains, which means that con-
flict settlement requires transmission and processing of qualitative information to
and by corporate management.
Corporate management does not have to receive and process qualitative
information in the absence of conflict, but high levels of interdependence still re-
quire extensive communication between business units in order to coordinate ac-
tivities because changes in one unit affect the outcome of another. Standardized
information on quantities and costs will not convey knowledge of the effect of
                                               
1 Assuming that corporate management resources are more valuable and thus have higher opportunity
Synergy and Organization 7
changes in one unit on another and may also be received too late to prevent de-
struction of value if they are only calculated periodically. Qualitative information
on planned changes and feedback on the effect on other activities therefore have
to be communicated between the concerned parties for gains to materialize.
Thus the levels of interdependence and conflict has to be considered when
selecting a coordination mechanism for an exchange. Thus we have proposition 3:
The choice of coordination mechanism depends on the level of interdependence and
conflict2:
· Transfer pricing is the least costly coordination mechanism. Transfer pric-
ing is appropriate when the levels of interdependence and conflict are low.
· Mutual adjustment is more costly than transfer pricing, but less costly than
planning and direction. Mutual adjustment is appropriate when the level of
interdependence is high and the level of conflict is low.
· Planning and direction is the most expensive form of coordination. Plan-
ning and direction is appropriate when the levels of interdependence and
conflict are high.
Different ways of ascertaining the level of interdependence has been pro-
posed, for example based on the pattern of the resource flow between business
units (Thompson, 1967, Van de Ven, Delbecq and Koenig, 1976), the volume and
significance of the exchange3 (McGann and Ferry, 1979), or the extent to which a
business unit’s outcome is determined by activities performed in other units
(Kelley and Thibaut, 1978, Victor and Blackburn, 1987). The latter two approaches
require data on specific relationships, whereas the first is concerned with the na-
ture of the relationship, which is of primary interest in this paper. Since outcomes
are determined by the type of coordination mechanism and not given, using out-
comes to determine the level of conflict associated whit each source of synergy is
                                                                                                                                             
costs.
2 In case of low interdependence between units, high levels of conflict does not affect outcomes. This instan-
ce is therefore not considered.
3 Transactional interdependence is increased the greater the number of different assets exchanged, the grea-
ter the amount of resource exchanged pr. unit of time, and the number of transactions pr. unit of time. The
shorter amount of time before cessation of relationship significantly affect outcome, the greater interdepen-
dence will be. Higher value of the resource also increase interdependence. The value of a resource depends
on the cost of substituting the resource, the cost of locating other supplier, the qualitative importance of
resource for outcomes, and the duration of relationship. The direction of resource flow also affect interde-
pendence (McGann and Ferry, 1979). Thus the receiver of a resource may perceive another degree of inter-
dependence than the supplier. Assets going back and forth between business units increase interdependence
compared to exchanges where one type of assets is traded for another.
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not possible, even though outcomes allows the level of conflict to be determined
directly from the outcomes4 (cf. Kelley and Thibaut, 1978, Victor and Blackburn,
1987).
Thompson (1967) describes three types of interdependence named pooled,
sequential and reciprocal interdependence. Pooled interdependence exists when
all units make discrete contributions to the whole and is supported by the whole
without either being directly dependent. When the asset shared among units is
drawn from a common pool of assets, asset sharing leads to pooled interdepend-
ence, which Thompson considers to be the lowest level of interdependence in an
organization. Asset sharing should therefore be compatible with transfer pricing
coordination according to proposition 3.
If two business units are engaged in a relationship, where one unit has to
perform its activity before the other is able to perform its activity, the business
units are sequentially interdependent. This is the case of vertical complementari-
ties, because R&D precedes production, which in turn precedes sales and mar-
keting, at least in the usual perception of these general business processes. Vertical
complementarities should thus exhibit higher levels of interdependence than asset
sharing because the level of interdependence is higher for sequential interdepend-
encies than for pooled interdependencies (Thompson, 1967). Even higher levels of
interdependence (reciprocal) is incurred if both business units are affected by the
concurrent actions of the other business unit. Horizontal complementarities im-
                                               
4 Neither the pattern of resource flow nor the volume and significance of the exchange does assess the po-
tential for conflict directly because the congruence or non-congruence between objectives is not considered.
Determining interdependence from outcomes, on the other hand, allows the level of conflict to be deter-
mined as well by allowing both negative and positive outcomes (Victor and Blackburn, 1987). However, this
requires that outcomes are known, and thus it could be argued that conflicts could be mitigated by a fair
profit sharing scheme between units. Changing the reward system to award each unit fairly for cooperating
may be disruptive to the general guidelines and therefore too costly if the cooperation only affects a minor
part of the units’ activities. Settling the conflict over distribution of rents through bilateral bargaining may
also prove too costly to allow rents to be captured if bargaining costs exceed the efficiency gain from coop-
erating. The level of interdependence for a unit can be ascertained by calculating the ratio of the sum of
outcomes (squared) contingent on the actions of other units to the sum of all outcomes (i.e. unit A’s depend-
ence on other units = outcomes influenced by other units2/all possible outcomes2). Likewise, the level of
conflict can be calculated as twice the sum of the products of unit A’s outcome and the product of other
units outcome divided by the squared outcomes of both unit A and other units (i.e. level of conflict = 2(unit
A’s outcomes influenced by other units * unit A’s outcomes independent of other units + other units’ out-
comes influenced by unit A* other units’ outcomes independent of unit A)/(å(all outcomes)2 ) (Formulas
derived from Victor and Blackburn, 1987).
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plies parallel activities contributing to a common outcome and will, thus, be more
(reciprocally) interdependent than asset sharing and vertical complementarities.
The symmetrical dependence present in reciprocal interdependencies
dampen manifest conflict because each party can threaten to withdraw from co-
operation, whereas the asymmetrical dependence present in sequential interde-
pendencies allows the independent business unit to hold up the dependent one.
Thus the level of conflict is assumed to be higher when sequential interdepend-
ence is present than in case of reciprocal interdependence. In other words, vertical
complementarities, being sequential interdependencies, are associated with high
levels of conflict and a significant degree of interdependence, and should thus,
according to proposition 3, be coordinated through planning and direction. Like-
wise, horizontal complementarities should exhibit low levels of conflict, because
dependence is symmetrical, and high levels of interdependence. Mutual adjust-
ment should, thus, be the appropriate coordination mechanism for horizontal
complementarities. This leads to proposition 4:
· Asset sharing should be coordinated through transfer prices.
· Vertical complementarities should be coordinated through planning and direc-
tion.
· Horizontal complementarities should be coordinated through mutual adjust-
ment.
However,  the exploitation of synergy sources are not independent of
other activities and exchanges which also require coordination. When the control
system is designed with multiple coordination mechanisms, or the control system
is affected by other control systems designed for controlling other activities, inter-
action effects will arise that can either reinforce or undermine the intended effect
of the control system. If the outcome of different tasks undertaken by an agent are
not equally easy to measure, attention will be diverted towards the tasks that are
easiest to measure (Thompson, 1967, Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1991). Even
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though multiple coordination mechanisms are feasible5, companies should there-
fore choose a limited number to avoid unforeseen interaction effects and confu-
sion.
The structure of the organization (e.g. the boundaries of business units)
determines whether a given source of synergy is exploited within a business unit
or through cooperation between business units. Thus, in a functionally organized
corporation (also referred to as U-form or purpose departmentation) horizontal
complementarities and asset sharing occur within business units because organ-
izational boundaries are drawn around similar activities (e.g. R&D, manufactur-
ing, marketing/sales), whereas divisionalized firms (also referred to as M-form or
process departmentation) set boundaries around vertical relationships which
makes vertical complementarities within-unit activities because R&D, production
and marketing/sales are located within the same business unit.
Due to the complexities of coordinating multiple interdivisional interde-
pendencies, bounded rationality will limit the ability to foresee the effects of
changes in, or additions to, the control systems, wherefore unintended side effects
might appear. Management therefore have to go through a process of trial and
error before an appropriate control system is in place6. Furthermore, the design of
a control system is not a complete indicator of the coordination effect achieved by
the system, since control systems can be implemented in different ways (Rotch,
1993). Companies with established control systems that works satisfactorily will
therefore resist frequent changes in the control system out of fear for unintended
effects. Changes in the control system will not take place unless major changes in
the composition of activities has occurred. Consistency over time in the way per-
formance is monitored and rewarded is important for the behavior adjusting ef-
fects of the control system since frequent changes may make managers uncertain
                                               
5 Application of one form of coordination does not preclude the use others at the same time (Van de Ven et
al., 1976). In fact, managers do employ multiple coordination mechanism to supplement each other for a
given task and to control multiple tasks (ibid). Van de Ven, Delbecq and Koenig (1976) also found that incre-
asing interdependence leads to the addition of supplementary coordination mechanisms rather than to sub-
stitution of certain types of coordination mechanisms.
6 An optimal control system is unlikely, since companies are open systems subject to influence from the
dynamics of the environment affecting the composition of tasks, even if one of the rationales of business
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about the consequences of their actions for their personal remuneration and thus
distort incentives. History and economic significance of activities may thus be im-
portant criteria in designing control systems, which means that new and/or less
important coordination tasks will receive only ad hoc attention and coordination.
Coordination of the different sources of synergy is not independent of
other activities taking place in the company. Nor will exploitation of all possible
synergies necessarily be the primary objective of a company, which means that
some sources of synergy will be exploited, while others will be ignored or unrea-
lized. This implies that synergies are company specific depending on the compo-
sition of the asset stock, the scope of activities and the design of the overall control
system7. Because of this contextual dependence the appropriate coordination of
different sources of synergy is firm specific, which leads us to proposition 5:
The choice of coordination mechanism not only depends on the level of interde-
pendence and conflict created by the activity, but also on other contextual factors
including organizational structure and experimentation due to bounded rational-
ity preventing optimal design of control systems.
In the next sections I provide a few illustrations collected from a study of
a successful Danish manufacturing company, Danfoss8.
Coordination of synergies at Danfoss
Since its establishment in 1933 Danfoss has been one of the most success-
ful Danish manufacturing companies. Every single year since 1933 Danfoss has
shown a positive profit. Danfoss is Denmark's largest industrial group with an
annual turnover of 15 billion DKK. and with about 20,000 employees. The com-
pany manufactures thousands of different products and product models within 14
broader product lines, particularly mechatronical products for industrial markets
such as thermostats for cooling and freezing equipment, comfort automatics
(products for temperature control, radiator thermostats, etc.), cooling and air-
                                                                                                                                             
organizations is to protect the operating core from environmental uncertainty and change (cf. Thompson,
1967).
7 This adds to the sustainability of the advantages gained from synergies because protection from imitation
is offered not only from evolving heterogeneity of resources and activities, but also from the consequent
heterogeneity of control systems among firms.
8 The examples are based on a case study of Danfoss conducted over three years (January 1996 to January
1999) by the author and Jens Frøslev Christensen (unpublished)
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conditioning automatics, hydraulic components and industrial instrumentation
(e.g. electronic flow meters). The company is divisionalized with ten product divi-
sions grouped into three “product families” acting as boards for the product fam-
ily’s product divisions9.
Figure 1: Danfoss’ organization-structure winter 1998/99
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Most of Danfoss’ products have one thing in common: They are located in
technical equipment and systems to control dynamic processes. Danfoss has
global market leadership within several of its product areas (e.g. some types of
hydraulic equipment, intelligent cooling systems, radiator thermostats, non-CFC
compressors and thermostats for refrigerators and freezers).
The relatedness in terms of technologies and markets provide rich op-
portunities for synergies of different kinds. Danfoss has, however, followed a path
of increasing decentralization and delegation concurrent with considerable
growth in the last three decades. Thus, from the death of the founder in 1966, and
markedly in the last decade, emphasis has shifted from centralized coordination
to delegation of operating and financial responsibility to the product line level.
                                               
9 In 1999, Danfoss has acquired a german company (effective from June 1.), Bauer Antriebstechnik GmbH,
which will become the eleventh division in Danfoss and be part of Motion Controls product family. Bauer
develops, produces and sells electric motors, gears, and gear motors, some of which can be integrated with
the products of the Drives Division.
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The following examples from Danfoss try to show how the emphasis on, and co-
ordination of, different sources of synergy has evolved over the past thirty years.
General description of the corporate control system at Danfoss
Decision making responsibilities have extensively been delegated to divi-
sional management, even the right to implement, for example, large development
projects or major acquisitions. The corporate function “Mergers & Acquisitions,
Legal Affairs and Patents” assists in negotiations and analysis when a division
wishes to acquire a company. Generally, the involvement of the executive com-
mittee in the affairs of the individual division depends on the perceived need. The
executive committee does not interfere with divisions with satisfactory financial
performance, but intervenes if a division’s results are unsatisfactory over a longer
period, or if its development activities have strategic importance for larger parts
of the corporation.
Collaboration among divisions is coordinated through a number of cross-
divisional committees and councils. There are seven cross-divisional committees
for, respectively, standardization, marketing, purchasing, quality assurance, pro-
duction technology, product development and Information Technology. The
committees consist of members from different divisions and corporate functions.
The committee for standardization have 12 councils called “Technical Advisory
Groups” (TAG’s) overseeing Construction, Quality Assurance, Production
Equipment and Logistics, Sales/Marketing, Purchasing, IT, Design and Corporate
Identity, Plants and Transport, Environment, Human Resource Management, Fi-
nance, and Components and Materials. The members of the committees are ap-
pointed by the executive committee, while the members of Danfoss’ TAGs are ap-
pointed by divisional management. Since the end of the 1980s Danfoss has also
systematically promoted inter-divisional efforts in nurturing key technologies of
importance for more than one division.
Among the corporate management’s control- and coordination mecha-
nisms are so-called “perspective plans”. The perspective plans contain informa-
tion on each division’s plans for the coming three years, and explanations for de-
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viations from the budgets contained in the previous perspective plans. The per-
spective plans are developed in connection with the budget-making procedure.
The executive committee has in recent years, although not every year, initiated the
development of the perspective plans by suggesting a theme (for example how to
create and exploit core competencies or improve cash management) for the year’s
perspective plan to the managers of the divisions. Divisional management collects
information from department managers and writes up the perspective plan which
is delivered to the executive committee four months later. The executive commit-
tee then reviews the plans and suggest possible changes.
In addition, the executive committee receives monthly and quarterly re-
ports from divisional management. Plans for projects running more than three
years are reported on ad-hoc basis. The executive committee sometimes suggests
specific projects to divisional management, but divisions are not obliged to accept
the proposals.
Asset sharing
Sharing of intangible assets
Despite increasing emphasis on market orientation, Danfoss remains a
technology-driven company relying on technological superiority in most of its
products and processes. The ability to share R&D costs among multiple product
lines therefore remains an important opportunity for gaining cost and differentia-
tion advantages compared to less diversified, or more unrelated diversified, com-
petitors.
Until 1971, Danfoss was a functionally organized company with a cen-
tralized R&D function serving all product areas. In 1971, Danfoss initiated a proc-
ess of divisionalization because of increased complexity in managing an expand-
ing product portfolio, consisting of, at that time, more than 300 different products.
In the process of divisionalization, three divisions with separate R&D depart-
ments were established. Because many technologies were still common to more
than one division, a corporate function for technology and research (CTR) was
retained at the corporate in order to serve the common interest of all divisions.
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As the product portfolio and the number of divisions continued to expand
up through the 1970’s, and the divisions gained more influence on the types of
activities performed in CTR through their provision of financial resources, CTR
became more of a pool of experts providing assistance in divisional development
projects than an initiator of corporate wide technology development. This ten-
dency was reversed in the 1980’s under new leadership, when the CTR regained
significant autonomy. CTR instead began focusing on fewer, more strategic R&D
projects leading to the creation of a number of new business ventures rather than
upgrading the technological capabilities of the divisions. Thus, the role of CTR
changed from developing technologies in common to several divisions aimed at
avoiding duplication of effort and amortizing development costs, to a role of pro-
viding corporate renewal through development of new business ventures.
In 1989 the director of CTR and a couple of R&D managers from the divi-
sions began exploring the opportunities for promoting cross-divisional sharing of
technologies prompted by the executive committee, which was anxious about the
effect of the increasing decentralization on the overall coherence of the corpora-
tion. Over the next couple of years a new tool called the “technology pyramid”
was developed with the aim of contributing to the creation and diffusion of tech-
nological capabilities. The “technology pyramid” was developed in participation
of heads of development, manufacturing and marketing from the divisions along
with substantial involvement from the executive committee. In late 1991, the re-
sponsibility for the “technology pyramid” was assigned to the CTR, which added
a new role to the department.
The technology pyramid contains a selection of technologies in which
Danfoss can (or want to) claim world-class expertise. These technologies have sig-
nificant value for more than one division10. The technology pyramid is not static
but regularly subject to consideration and changes, especially regarding the tech-
nologies under consideration.
                                               
10 For technologies that are only important to one division, the interested division in question is expected to
take full responsibility
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“Synergy” was situated as the top of the technology pyramid in 1996, re-
flecting the overall ambition and common denominator of the technology pyra-
mid11. Danfoss defines synergy as:
“.... a net improvement in output, margins, or some other measure of perform-
ance that can be reliably traced to structured, purposeful collaboration among
different units or to the merging of two or more units.”
Figure 1: Danfoss' Technology-
pyramid until 1996
Synergy
Key Competencies
Key Disciplines
At the next level in the pyramid were seven key com-
petencies defined as those capabilities where Danfoss
wished to achieve global leadership. Four competen-
cies were related to product technology (e.g. Control
Engineering, Mechatronics, Man Machine Interface
and Product Development Technology), while two
were related to process technology (Methods
and Management Philosophy for Continuous Improvement, and Materials and
Processes). The last key competence was Business Concept Development. The aim
was to turn key competencies into core competencies, which Danfoss defines as a
complex mesh of knowledge and skills that make their products and services bet-
ter than anyone else’s. Danfoss’ ability to select, exploit and develop the right core
competencies is considered crucial to the present and future competitiveness of
the corporation. Developing and maintaining core competencies is considered to
require so much effort that Danfoss is only able focus on five to eight of them at a
time.
The lowest level of the technology pyramid was Danfoss’ key disciplines,
which were capabilities that Danfoss wanted to master on a level equal to the best
of its competitors. In 1996, several of the initially 29 disciplines had been replaced,
either because their development was considered complete (five key disciplines
were considered well-established), or because they had failed to show the antici-
pated potential (nine key disciplines were kept under observation). Additional
key disciplines had been introduced which brought the number of key disciplines
                                               
11 By 1996, synergy had replaced the original five key areas of “Management”, “Management of Technolo-
gy”, “Continuous improvements”, “Total Marketing Management” and “Time Based Competition”, which
were never clearly operationalized into active programs.
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up to 20 in 1996. Eight of the key disciplines were related to product technology,
seven were related to process technology, and five to marketing and manage-
ment12.
Since 1996 the terms key disciplines and key competencies have been re-
placed by the term key technologies. To focus and strengthen effort in each of the
key technologies the 27 key competencies and disciplines were reduced to 12 key
technologies13. These technologies have received more resources than were as-
signed before. The emphasis has shifted from a mix of R&D, manufacturing and
marketing technologies towards product development technologies, which domi-
nate the present portfolio of technologies. Another current development of the
technology pyramid is the ongoing development of a database aiming at storing
all relevant information concerning the key technologies for ease of access and
comprehensiveness for the users of the technology pyramid.
All employees of Danfoss are allowed to suggest new key technologies,
but the decision to include a technology in the Technology Pyramid is dependent
upon approval by one of Danfoss’ seven cross-divisional committees to ensure
that the technology has a wide variety of applications in Danfoss. The committees
review the content of the technology pyramid, and one or two members from each
committee are appointed to form a technical advisory group responsible for the
practical work and decisions concerning the technology pyramid. The committee
responsible for a key technology appoints one to five gatekeepers who are respon-
sible for the actual development and monitoring of the relevant technologies, and
a sponsor who is responsible for assuring proper linkages and coordination be-
tween the committee and the gatekeepers, and for making sure that potential us-
ers of the technology are made aware of developments. The responsible commit-
tee can recommend and approve activities beyond what is budgeted in the divi-
sion employing the gatekeeper. The gatekeepers do not work full time on their
technology but are expected to fulfill their normal duties in the division that em-
ploys them. At the practical level inter-divisional experience groups formed by
                                               
12 Distribution of the core disciplines among the three categories is not unequivocal.
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the gatekeepers promote the improvement and development activities associated
with each of the high-priority technologies. The gatekeepers’ tasks depend on the
characteristics of the technology, which differ widely among the key technologies.
Thus, for some technologies, the work of the gatekeeper is application-oriented
learning by doing, while for others the primary activities are experience exchange
and networking.
With the implementation of the “technology pyramid” the CTR took re-
sponsibility for providing guidance in the selection and development of new
technological capabilities rather than developing the technologies themselves for
later dissemination throughout the company. Duplication of effort is reduced and
critical mass achieved by establishing and managing a network of competence
acquirers and providing a link between the competence acquirers and divisional
development teams in need of the technological capabilities.
In the last couple of years, the CTR has been closed down, and its activi-
ties divided among different divisions and corporate functions. Many of the
regular R&D activities have been transferred to the divisions in order to streng-
then their incentives for undertaking R&D and allow greater integration with
their business strategies. Short term projects such as consulting or technological
extension services has been transferred to a Central Service department owned
and operated by the divisions. The Central Service department assists in projects
related to standardization, approvals, materials technologies, IT development,
production services and man-machine interfaces. These activities are primarily
funded by the divisions on hourly rates14. The “technology pyramid” is now the
responsibility of the corporate function “Quality and Technology”15, which un-
dertakes projects and activities related to quality management, process develop-
ment, environment and supply chain management, whereas ongoing business
development projects and new ventures have been transferred to a corporate
                                                                                                                                             
13 The contents and title of the key technologies evolve as well, which makes it difficult to track individual
technologies.
14 The rates have approximately doubled since the reorganization meaning that the divisions now pay all
costs of running the function.
15 The Quality and Technology department is also working on developing non-financial performance mea-
sures.
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function for business ventures. The patenting unit of CTR has been merged with
other legal advisory services and a unit assisting in mergers and acquisitions to
form a separate corporate function called M&A, Legal and Patents.
The way sharing of technological assets in Danfoss has been coordinated
has thus changed from the centralized planning style until 1971, followed by a
decade of a somewhat failed attempt at coordinating through transfer prices (di-
rect divisional funding of an increasing number of individual projects without
much coherence).  The move back towards central planning of corporate R&D in
the 1980’s resulted in a decoupling of corporate R&D from the objective of up-
grading divisional technological capabilities through shared technology develop-
ment. This objective appears to be better served through the invention of the tech-
nology pyramid which allows the divisions to mutually adjust their common
technological development through the networks of committees, sponsors and
gatekeepers. The ongoing organizational restructurations has also put increasing
emphasis on establishing devices for coordinating sharing of intangible assets be-
longing to the divisions rather than sharing assets under corporate ownership.
Thus the dynamics of technology diversification has changed the way Danfoss
organize and coordinates sharing of technological capabilities.
Sharing of tangible assets
Danfoss is a vertically integrated company undertaking a large part of its
own component manufacture. Thus with increasing, but related, diversification
and divisionalization going on, particularly after 1971, opportunities for shared
components manufacture among separate product lines continue to arise. When
divisionalization began in 1971, most manufacturing activities were transferred to
the newly established divisions, but the manufacturing activities that served sev-
eral of the divisions continued under the responsibility of the corporate head-
quarters.
Even when decentralization was taken further in 1988 entailing among
other things divisional responsibility for purchasing, corporate headquarters still
continued to operate corporate manufacturing plants, although additional pro-
duction activities have been transferred to the divisions.
Synergy and Organization 20
Until 1996, internal sourcing was considered strategic, among other things
to maintain Danfoss’ reputation for high quality products, sustain manufacturing
capabilities and secure employment levels, thus putting pressure on the divisions
to buy from the corporate plants. Decisions concerning outsourcing of manufac-
ture had to be based on analysis of the suppliers’ ability to supply products or
components that met the required specifications on time at a cost that was lower
than the full cost including cost of capital of internal manufacture. Danfoss also
considered whether external sourcing would grant access to new know-how that
was of strategic importance to Danfoss, or imply transfer of know how to suppli-
ers that Danfoss wanted to keep proprietary. Suppliers were also evaluated on
their willingness to accommodate large fluctuations in demand.
Major reorganizations beginning in 1996 has, however, put more empha-
sis on financial responsibility, also of the component manufacturing plants. As a
result of the reorganization, the manufacturing centers16 which previously were
operated by corporate management, have been transferred to the product divi-
sions, who share ownership of the manufacturing centers. The largest internal
customer of each of the manufacturing centers was given the responsibility of
overseeing its operations, while the individual manufacturing center operates as
an independent profit center supplying both internal and external customers. The
manufacturing centers compete with external suppliers for the orders, since there
are no mandated transfers. Internal transfers are priced based on a target profit for
the center set by its board consisting of representatives from the divisions. Tangi-
ble asset sharing in the form of transferring equipment between divisions is based
on bilaterally negotiated prices.
Shared component production has thus changed from central planning
coordination until 1971 to changing transfer pricing rules with progressively more
financial responsibility (from corporate subsidized cost based prices to full cost
based prices with corporate pressure for internal sourcing, and then to autono-
mous profit centers in competition with outside suppliers) and decreasing corpo-
                                               
16 The manufacturing centres manufactures electronics, plastic components, springs etc. The manufacturing
centers are all located in Nordborg.
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rate intervention. Despite more divisional freedom to source components from
external suppliers, the corporate manufacturing centers have grown in size up to
approximately 1,000 employees in the last couple of years. Even though growth is
partly due to increased sales to external customers, external sales are still modest,
implying that significant advantages of shared manufacturing assets are obtained
and may have increased with the exposition to competition from external suppli-
ers.
Vertical complementarity
From the early steps toward divisionalization in 1971, product lines and
divisions have gradually gained control over increasing parts of their individual
value chains. Thus the first three divisions were authorized to build their own
sales and development departments. As Danfoss continued to grow, activities
have continued to be split up among self contained business units (divisions and
product lines) in order to decrease product range heterogeneity within each busi-
ness unit and thus strengthen market focus. Increasing control over sales and
marketing within the business units provides a more direct linkage between de-
velopment, production and marketing which eases mutual adaptation and moni-
toring of results because performance is evaluated against customer reactions.
The perhaps most radical change implemented during the major reor-
ganization beginning in 1996 was the reorganization of the sales organization
where the two regional sales divisions established in 1988 were dismantled and
most of the sales personnel divided among the product lines (within the divi-
sions), who assumed responsibility for their own sales activities and expenses. As
of April 1998 the old sales organization has been further decentralized with each
of the product lines having full financial responsibility for its own sales. A small
residual of the central sales organization has been retained at the corporate level
(Market Development Division), while the rest has been transferred to 12 regional
sales organizations with separate sub-organizations for each product line. Sales
and marketing is now carried out by separate sales organizations for each product
line. Sales offices in smaller countries or regions where Danfoss has no local
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manufacturing, however, operates as if they were independent sales agents with
the right to refuse to market and sell products that are not sufficiently profitable,
or renegotiate prices with the supplying product lines.
Reorganization from a functionally organized to a divisionalized and in-
creasingly decentralized company has thus given the product lines more control
over both product development, production and sales over the past thirty years.
This has increased the opportunities for mutual adjustment among the stages of
value creation within each of Danfoss’ 14 product lines.
Horizontal complementarity
Even though the continued decentralization has decreased horizontal co-
ordination in the last thirty years, it has remained an important objective for Dan-
foss to obtain horizontal synergies17. Thus the acquisition strategy of Danfoss is to
strengthen market positions and, generally, not to acquire critical R&D capabili-
ties. An important element in the strategy for acquiring European companies is to
find companies whose products complement those of Danfoss and can be mar-
keted through Danfoss’ existing distribution network, although the increased ac-
quisition activity in recent years has included acquisition of direct competitors.
The objective of acquiring companies located outside Europe is also to increase
capacity of distribution and create credibility in relation to local partners. The ac-
quisition strategy and the corporate function specialized in acquisitions direct di-
visional acquisitions.
The sales companies were in 1988 allowed to supplement the Danfoss
product range with products from external suppliers provided the products met
Danfoss quality standards and were not marketed under the Danfoss brand.
During the first half of the 1990’s Danfoss tried to promote “cross product
line selling”, but the limited “cross product line selling” activities that were im-
plemented were not perceived to have been successful, and had, furthermore,
contributed to obscure the actual cost of selling individual products. That made
corporate management feel that product lines needed more attention to the real
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cost of selling, which were considered too high. Thus, there are no specific re-
wards to sales management and personnel for trying to sell, or learning about,
products from other product lines. The product lines do, however, source prod-
ucts and components from each other based on prices settled by negotiation.
One of the objectives of the Market Development division established in
1998 is to contribute to filling the gaps in Danfoss’ product range and coordinate
collaboration among product lines. This will be done by targeting specific “Strate-
gic Business Areas” (SBA) where products from different product lines can be
marketed collectively for a specific application18. Thus, instead of having all sales
personnel trying to find opportunities for “cross product line selling”, creation of
horizontal complementarities between related products is now being promoted by
the Market Development Division targeting specific “Strategic Business Areas”,
where the benefits are perceived to be greatest.
Danfoss’ ten product divisions were, in 1998, grouped into three “product
families”, Refrigeration Controls, Motion Controls, and Heating and Water Con-
trols according to the criteria of similarity and common interest. One of the objec-
tives of forming the product families was to increase awareness of gaps in the
product ranges between the divisions in the product families, which may lead to
identification of new business opportunities. So far the “product families” do not
have their own staff and joint functions except for Refrigeration Controls, which
has established a joint R&D unit that supports joint projects in the field of refrig-
eration technology. The other two “product families” do not share functions or
activities at “product family”-level, except for a few bilateral coordination projects
concerning marketing and technology substitution.
Thus, horizontal complementarities are now coordinated through spe-
cialized organizational structures (i.e. product families, Market Development Di-
                                                                                                                                             
17 In fact, inter-divisional cooperation appears to have increased, especially in the last six years.
18 The first SBA is water supply and -purification in Asia. Danfoss offers a full range of components for
operating for example water purification plants (e.g. electromagnetic flowmeters and oxygen meters for
exact measurement, frequency converters for controlling the electrical motors, pressure transmitters for
overload protection and non-return valves matching the flowmeters). These products are otherwise marke-
ted independently by the responsible product lines, but coordinated effort might be beneficial. Other poten-
tial SBA’s include shipbuilding and heating, ventilation and air-conditioning (Danfoss newspaper, no. 20,
1998: 8-9).
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vision and a Mergers and Acquisition Department) facilitating mutual adjustment,
instead of providing incentives for “cross product line selling” (i.e. a sort of trans-
fer pricing rule). Mutual adjustment among divisions, which is facilitated by the
cross-divisional committees and the formation of the product families has also
replaced centralized planning of horizontal complementarities which has been
gradually abandoned since 1971.
Concluding remarks
The paper has shown that the typology of synergy is useful for describing
synergies in Danfoss, thus confirming proposition 1. Moreover, it seems that it
does not pay to pursue all possible sources of synergy, since counterweighing
costs and objectives has led Danfoss to forego synergies pursued in the past and
renege on pursuing other synergies. This finding supports proposition 2. The
trend in Danfoss towards increased emphasis on transfer pricing and mutual ad-
justment and decreasing direction and planning from the corporate headquarters
supports proposition 3. The organization of vertical complementarities within
business units (i.e. divisions and product lines) substitutes divisional planning
and direction for corporate planning which supports both the proposition that
intervention by corporate management is the most expensive coordination
mechanism (proposition 3) and the proposition that vertical complementarities
needs to be coordinated through planning and direction (proposition 4).
Proposition 4 is also partially supported by the fact that tangible asset
sharing is coordinated through transfer pricing, although intangible asset sharing
appear to be better coordinated through mutual adjustment. Horizontal comple-
mentarities are coordinated through mutual adjustment consistent with proposi-
tion 4.
The experiences of Danfoss points to that coordination of synergies is in
fact dependent on the overall organizational context and, furthermore, not easily
accomplished consistent with proposition 5. Another general observation in Dan-
foss is a failed process of moving directly from centralized planning to extreme
decentralization, which has led the company to establish organizational facilita-
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tors for mutual adjustment concurrent with ongoing decentralization. This lends
further support to proposition 5.
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